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I. INTRODUCTION
A surviving form of common law, a Dead Man’s statute2 is “a law prohibiting the
admission of a decedent’s3 statement as evidence in certain circumstances, as when
an opposing party or witness seeks to use the statement to support a claim against the
decedent’s estate.”4 Over the past 150 years, these statutes have “excluded the
testimony of the parties to [a] lawsuit and of all persons having a direct pecuniary or
1
After receiving his B.S., magna cum laude, from the University of Tennessee, the author
received his J.D., cum laude, from the University of Richmond School of Law. The author
currently serves as the judicial clerk to the Honorable S. Thomas Anderson, U.S. Magistrate
Judge for the Western District of Tennessee. This article is dedicated to the author’s family:
to Ed and Liz, to Mollie and Nathan, to Meg, and to Diana. The author wishes to thank
Professor Marci Kelly for her valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
2
Authorities and commentators are inconsistent as to whether the proper term is “Dead
Man statute,” “Dead Man’s statute,” or “Deadman’s statute.” For purposes of this article, the
author will use “Dead Man’s statute.”
3

For purposes of this paper, the author will use the word “decedent” to refer to the
individual a Dead Man’s statute is designed to protect. Although in various Dead Man’s
statutes, other types of individuals, including insane persons and the like, are protected, using
“decedent” alone will assist with the flow of the article.
4

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (7th ed. 1999).

75
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proprietary interest in the outcome [of a lawsuit].”5 While they may very well be
applicable in other circumstances, including family law matters,6 the majority of
Dead Man’s statute case law centers around an interested witness being refused the
right to testify in a probate proceeding.
Dead Man’s statutes have received constant criticism since their first appearance
almost 150 years ago;7 however, these statutes still remain valid law in many states.
Dead Man’s statutes are confusing to lawyers, judges, scholars and the average
citizen, as “[t]he mere mention of the [Dead Man’s] statute is enough to make most
practitioners shudder.”8 More importantly, these statutes are unfairly prejudicial to
those truly honest people who have valid claims but are nevertheless prevented from
testifying in court. Therefore, in order to move toward an evidentiary system that is
fairer to the majority of people and to be in line with the majority of states that have
rejected the Dead Man’s statute altogether,9 this paper will propose a modification or
a replacement for those states that still have a Dead Man’s statute.
5

J. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65, at 250 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].

6
See generally Steve Planchon, Comment, The Application of the Dead Man’s Statute in
Family Law, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 561 (2000).
7

For a more complete discussion of the criticisms behind Dead Man’s statutes, see infra
Part IV.
8

Michael D. Simon & William T. Hennessey, Estates, Trusts, and Guardianships: 1998
Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA. L. REV. 119, 145 (1998).
9
Thirty-two states have expressly rejected the Dead Man’s Statute. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1261 (West 2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/8-101 (West 2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); GA. CODE ANN. § 249-1 (2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-49 (2004)
(permitting testimony from an interested witness); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-34 (Michie
2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Michie
2003) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-102
(Michie 2003) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.310
(2001) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); IOWA CODE § 622.3 (1997) (“No
person offered as a witness in any action or proceeding in any court . . . shall be excluded by
reason of the person’s interests in the event of the action or proceeding, or because the person
is a party thereto, except as provided in this chapter.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 (1997)
(permitting testimony from an interested witness); MO. REV. STAT. § 491.010 (1997)
(permitting testimony from an interested witness); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.075 (1997)
(“Evidence is not inadmissible solely because it is evidence of transactions or conversations
with or the actions of a deceased person.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 2601 (1997) (noting that
“[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in this Code);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-172 (1996) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); R.I.
GEN. LAWS 9-17-12 (1996) (“No person shall be disqualified from testifying in any civil
action or proceeding by reason of his or her being interested therein or being a party thereto.”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:25 (repealed 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (repealed
1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-7 (repealed 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (repealed
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1202 (repealed 1975); DEL. R. EVID. 601 (superseding the
Delaware’s Deadman’s Statute and permitting testimony from an interested witness); MINN.
R. EVID. 616 (superceding Deadman’s Statute and permitting testimony from an interested
witness); MONT. R. EVID. 601 (abolishing the state’s Deadman’s Statute and permitting
testimony from an interested witness); N.D. R. EVID. 601 (superceding North Dakota’s
Deadman’s Statute and permitting testimony from an interested witness); TEX. R. EVID. 601
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In order to understand why Dead Man’s statutes should be amended by state
legislatures, it is important to look at the historical context of Dead Man’s statutes
and how they have been handled, interpreted and applied in different states.
Consequently, Part II of this paper presents an historical outline of Dead Man’s
statutes; Part III surveys nine states that currently have a common law Dead Man’s
statute; Part IV analyzes the weaknesses behind the Dead Man’s statute; Part V
presents three separate alternatives that states should consider adopting in lieu of
their current Dead Man’s statutes. Finally, part VI concludes this paper.
II. A HISTORY OF DEAD MAN’S STATUTES
The modern day Dead Man’s statute is the descendant of ancient English law.
During the fifteenth century, juries in England consisted only of those persons who
were familiar with the context of the case; therefore, the parties and witnesses to a
lawsuit were also interested.10 Disinterested witnesses were actually discouraged
from participating in the proceedings.11 This practice, however, was amended over
time, and in the seventeenth century, English law gave a defendant two choices for
his or her trial: a trial by jury or a wager of law.12 Under a wager of law, a defendant
was tried solely on his or her own testimony and the testimony of those who would
testify on his or her behalf.13 Under a trial by jury, however, the defendant did not
testify on his or her own behalf; instead, the jury decided guilt or innocence based on
the weight of the evidence.14 “Before a jury, the parties do not swear. They plead
orally, or argue, or allege things ‘in evidence’ – either by themselves or by their
counsel; but they do not take an oath.”15 The trial by jury soon became the normal
choice for defendants, and therefore, the choice of wager of law was removed as an
option.16 In a trial by jury, however, interested witnesses were prohibited from
testifying. English courts determined that juries were unable to properly weigh the
(abrogating the Dead Man’s Statute); UTAH R. EVID. 601 (permitting testimony of an
interested witness); Johnson v. Porter, 471 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ohio 1984) (holding that
Evidence Rule 601 abrogated the Deadman’s Statute); Cavanah v. Martin, 590 P.2d 41, 42
(Alaska 1979) (“Alaska has completely eliminated the common law disqualification of
witnesses based on interest, including when their interest involves a claim against an estate.”);
Davis v. Hare, 561 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ark. 1978) (noting that the Arkansas Deadman’s Statute
“was in fact expressly repealed by the [state’s adoption of the] Uniform Rules of Evidence”);
Hew v. Aruda, 462 P.2d 476, 479 (Haw. 1969) (noting that this “archaic rule of
disqualification” has “not [been] adopted in Hawaii”); Scott v. Farrow, 391 P.2d 47 (Kan.
1964); Estate of Bergman v. Gunn, 761 P.2d 452, 455 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that New
Mexico’s Deadman’s Statute was repealed in 1973).
10
2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575, at 800-02 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) [hereinafter
WIGMORE].
11

Id. at 802 (“[I]t was rather the disinterested persons who were likely to be treated as
improper witnesses.”).
12

Id. at 806.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.
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testimony; therefore, “[u]ntil 1843 no person who had been convicted of a crime or
had any pecuniary interest in a case could give evidence at its trial . . . .”17
In the nineteenth century, due to changing circumstances and criticism, English
law officially abolished the statutory disqualifications for interest. English legal
scholar Jeremy Bentham “first furnished the arsenal of arguments for transforming
the public opinion.”18 Instead of prohibiting an interested person from testifying on
his own behalf or on someone else’s behalf, Lord Denman’s Act in 1843 adopted a
policy that gave the jury the power of deciding guilt or innocence. The Act states as
follows:
Whereas the inquiry after truth in courts of justice is often obstructed by
incapacities created by the present law, and it is desirable that full
information as to the facts in issue, both in criminal and in civil cases,
should be laid before the persons who are appointed to decide upon them,
and that such persons should exercise their judgment on the credit of the
witnesses adduced, and on the truth of their testimony.19
Only eight years later, in 1851, England passed another Act, amending its laws of
evidence to allow interested witnesses and parties who were “competent and
compellable to give evidence.”20 After Lord Denman’s Act and the 1851 evidentiary
changes, England did not enact a form of Dead Man’s statute prohibiting interested
persons from testifying.21
In the United States, many of the states followed England’s lead in abolishing the
disinterested witness rules. In 1841, Michigan was the first state to abolish the
interest disqualification,22 and the remaining states followed Michigan’s lead by
1904.23 Although these states removed the interested witness disqualification, the
same states began enacting Dead Man’s statutes to “protect[] estates of decedents.”24
Judge Alpheus F. Haymond of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, who
supported the creation of these statutes, wrote in 1878 that
the intention of the law in the exception to the privilege to testify was
intended to prevent an undue advantage on the part of the living over the
dead, who cannot confront the survivor, or give his version of the affairs,
or expose the omissions, mistakes or perhaps falsehoods of such survivor.
The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases is considered
17

Id. at 816-17.

18

Id. at 816.

19

Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 85 (Eng.); see also WIGMORE,
supra note 10, § 488, at 647-48 n.1 (quoting Lord Denman’s Act).
20

Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 99 (Eng.).

21
Stanley E. Didisman, The West Virginia Dead Man’s Statute, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 239,
240 (1957).
22

Act of Apr. 13, 1841, Pub. L. No. 80, § 1, 1841 Mich. Pub. Acts 176, 176-77 (codified
as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2158 (2003)).
23

WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 488, at 647 n.1.

24

Didisman, supra note 21, at 240-41.
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too great, to allow the surviving party to testify in his own behalf. Any
other view of this subject, I think would place in great peril the estates of
the dead, and would in fact make them an easy prey for the dishonest and
unscrupulous, which with due deference to the views and opinions of
others, it seems to me, the Legislature never intended.25
Judge Haymond’s views were shared by many of those in favor of enacting Dead
Man’s statutes; therefore, statutes were drafted “to prevent the fabrication of claims
that neither the deceased nor the executor of the estate is in a position to rebut and to
preserve estates for the benefit of heirs of the decedent whenever there is any room
to doubt the merits of the claims being brought.”26
In the years following Judge Haymond’s remarks, Dead Man’s statutes were
enacted across the nation to ensure equality in the courtroom.27 Many commentators
supported these statutes, and one particular scholar noted that
[i]t is also easy for persons, who are prejudiced or prepossessed, to put
false and unequal glosses upon what they give in evidence; and therefore
the law removes them from testimony, to prevent their sliding into
perjury; and it can be no injury to truth to remove those from the jury,
whose testimony may hurt themselves, and can never induce any rational
belief.28
Another commentator noted that state legislatures not only enacted Dead Man’s
statute legislation, but they also felt entirely justified with their states’ Dead Man’s
statutes.29
In time, however, commentators began to point to the confusing nature and
unfairness of these statutes, noting that certain individuals were not allowed to testify
because of an assumption that all interested parties are dishonest. Criticism began to
grow for these statutes, and, in 1922, the first of many public outcries was published
demanding the statutes’ revocation. In 1922, the Commonwealth Trust Fund of New
York selected a committee of eight persons30 to study this evidentiary rule.31 After
surveying 300 trial judges and attorneys, the Committee “reached the conclusion that
the rule was not a necessary protection against false claims, but rather an obstruction

25

Owens v. Owens’s Adm’r, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878).

26

B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.1, at 503-04 (1995).

27

Montgomery County v. Herlihy, 575 A.2d 784, 789-90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).

28

WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 576, at 810 (quoting BARON GILBERT, EVIDENCE 119
(1726)).
29
Shawn K. Stevens, Comment, The Wisconsin Deadman’s Statute: The Last Surviving
Vestige of an Abandoned Common Law Rule, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 281, 284-85 (1998).
30
The Committee consisted of Judges William A. Johnston, the Chief Justice of the Kansas
Supreme Court, Judge Charles M. Hough of the U.S. Court of Appeals, and professors from
Harvard University, Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Yale University, the
University of Michigan, and Northwestern University. See WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578a,
at 824 n.1.
31

Id. at 824.
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to the thorough investigation of truth.”32 Using Connecticut’s evidentiary system as
a model, the Committee found that a vast majority of those surveyed favored a lessrestrictive Dead Man’s statute.33 The Committee thus urged that New York adopt a
statute similar to Connecticut’s, which allowed both statements of the interested
person and statements of the decedent.34
The Dead Man’s statute suffered another blow “[i]n 1938 when the American
Bar Association’s Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence referred to
the [D]ead [M]an’s statute as an anachronism and an obstruction to truth.”35 The
Committee, which consisted of nearly seventy persons from all fifty states and all
U.S. territories, agreed with the New York Committee and “recommended the
substitution of a rule similar to the present permissory statue of Connecticut . . . .”36
Since the ABA’s report, states have enacted legislation to abolish their Dead Man’s
statutes;37 nevertheless, a number of states have refused to alter or otherwise amend
the ancient form of disqualification statute.38
While there is no federal Dead Man’s statute,39 the federal government enacted
legislation affecting the survivability of these acts. In 1972, the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence first proposed that an interested requirement be totally
removed at the federal judiciary level, and proposed Rule 601 was drafted to read
that “[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as provided in these rules.”40
Because the remaining Dead Man’s statutes were different in language and scope,
the Committee proposed that the statutes should no longer have effect in federal
diversity cases.41 Congress, however, did not go so far as to outlaw Dead Man’s
statutes; instead, the House Judiciary Committee decided that Dead Man’s statutes
represented a form of state policy that should not be overturned without a state’s
input.42 Even though there was “substantial disagreement as to the merit of Dead
Man’s Statutes,”43 Congress added a second sentence to Rule 601 that noted that “the
competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with state law.”44 Thus,

32

Id. at 825.

33

Id. at 824.

34

Id. at 825.

35

Didisman, supra note 21, at 248 (quoting 36 ABA Rep. 581 (1938)).

36

WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578a, at 826.

37

For examples of those states that have abolished their Dead Man’s statutes, see supra
note 9.
38

See infra Part III.

39

MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS
ed. 1988).

AND

PROBLEMS 36 (2d

40

See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s note.

41

Id.

42

See H.R. REP. NO. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).

43

Id. at 9.

44

FED. R. EVID. 601; see also GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 36.
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although the Advisory Committee hoped to do away with these statutes in the
1970’s, Congress gave a much needed breath of life to Dead Man’s statutes.
Besides the Advisory Committee, over the past 100 years Dead Man’s statutes
have survived public policy assaults by a number of distinguished commentators,
including Dean Wigmore.45 The statutes have also survived challenges brought forth
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.46
While these individual challenges have been unsuccessful, states have continued
to pass legislation that abolishes Dead Man’s statutes. One such route taken by
states has been to follow the guidelines enacted by the 1972 Advisory Committee to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Alabama, in 1996, enacted Alabama Rule of
Evidence 601, which reads as follows: “Every person is competent to be a witness
except as otherwise provided in these rules.”47 It is unclear whether this rule, which
is similar to the Advisory Committee’s first proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 601,
actually abolished the common law Dead Man’s statute in Alabama.48 While the
Advisory Committee to the Alabama Rules of Evidence notes that the Dead Man’s
statute has been abrogated, the Alabama Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether
or not the statute has been officially abolished.49 Nevertheless, one professor at the
University of Alabama School of Law believes that the Alabama Supreme Court will
shortly announce via a certified question from federal district court that Rule 601 did
abrogate the state’s Dead Man’s statute.50
While Alabama’s Supreme Court has not yet determined whether Rule 601
abrogated the Alabama Dead Man’s statute, Ohio’s Court of Appeals, in Jenkins v.
Bazzoli, rejected the Ohio Dead Man’s statute in favor of Ohio Rule of Evidence
601.51

45

See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578; Roy R. Ray, Dead Man’s Statutes, 24 OHIO
ST. L.J. 89, 110 (1963).
46

See, e.g., In re Estate of Lopata v. Metzel, 641 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo. 1982) (holding that
the statute involves neither a suspect classification nor an infringement of a fundamental
right); Russell v. Wolford, 395 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the statute
did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses); Murphy v. Hook, 316 N.E.2d
146, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (stating that there is “no basis for declaring the Dead Man’s Act
unconstitutional”).
47

ALA. R. EVID. 601.

48

See ALA. CODE § 12-21-163 (1997).

49

Jerome A. Hoffman, The Alabama Rules of Evidence: Their First Half-Dozen Years, 54
ALA. L. REV. 241, 295 (2002) (“Whether Alabama’s ‘Dead Man Statute’ has survived the
stroke awaits determination by the Alabama Supreme Court, which – at last look – had not yet
addressed the question.”).
50

See e-mail from Charles Gamble, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of
Law, to the author (Feb. 28, 2004) (on file with author); see also e-mail from Jerome A.
Hoffman, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, to the author (Mar. 1,
2004) (on file with author).
51

650 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
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Overall, most states have followed the initial leads of Connecticut and New York
and have abolished their Dead Man’s statutes.52 Some states, however, retain some
form of this ancient common law rule and apply the ancient doctrine that because
“[d]eath has sealed the lips of one of the parties,” legislation should exist to silence
the remaining interested parties.53
III. A SURVEY OF STATE DEAD MAN’S STATUTES
The various Dead Man’s statutes in existence vary widely from state to state;
therefore, this paper will present an overview of nine states that currently have some
form of a Dead Man’s statute.54 Because this paper proposes that current Dead
Man’s statutes unfairly burden certain individuals, this paper will not examine
certain state Dead Man’s statutes that have partially limited the application of the
traditional rule.55 Also, in addition to Alabama’s Dead Man’s statute, which may no
longer be applicable, this paper will also not examine Colorado’s Dead Man’s
Statute, which was redefined in 2002,56 and Arizona’s Dead Man’s Statute.57
Each Dead Man’s statute is different, in that it affects a different person or is
limited to a specific type of action, but most of the statutes focus on the same
criteria. Overall, Dead Man’s statutes were enacted for the same basic purpose, and
most statutes are strictly construed to limit their application to a limited set of events;
however, each of the following nine statutes differ in respect to (1) what type of
proceeding is required for the statute to apply, (2) who is prohibited from testifying,
52

See Simon & Hennessey, supra note 8 and accompanying text.

53

O’Connor v. Slatter, 93 P. 1078, 1079 (Wash. 1908).

54

This article overviews the following states’ Dead Man’s statutes: Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
55
See IDAHO CODE § 9-202 (Michie 1997) (noting that certain testimony in writing is
allowed); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2166 (West 1997) (permitting an interested witness
to testify as to any communications she had with the deceased if her testimony is supported by
material evidence tending to corroborate her claim); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-2 (West 1997)
(noting that interested witnesses can introduce testimony if there is clear and convincing proof
to support the claim); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4519 (McKinney 1997) (permitting an interested
witness to testify as to any facts of any automobile, aircraft, or boating accident in which both
she and the decedent were involved and where the interested witness is claiming negligence);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5930 (West 1997) (permitting an interested witness to testify as to
any communications she had with the deceased if the action or proceeding is by or against
surviving or remaining partners, joint promisors, or joint promisees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1602 (1997) (permitting an interested witness to testify as to any memoranda or declarations
of the deceased relevant to the matter in issue when the interested witness is suing in tort).
56
The Colorado Dead Man’s statute was only recently revised in 2002; therefore, no case
law presently exists on the legislature’s newly enacted statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90102 (2002). For a thorough discussion on the statute, see H. Tucker et al., The New Colorado
Dead Man’s Statute, 31 COLO. LAW. 7, 119 (2002).
57
In Arizona, the applicability of the Dead Man’s statute is at the discretion of the trial
court; therefore, because of its subjective application, this paper will not examine the statute.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2251 (2003); Troutman v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 826 P.2d 810, 812
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Mahan v. First Nat’l Bank of Arizona, 677 P.2d 301, 303 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1984).
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(3) what the person is prohibited from testifying about in the trial, and (4) when the
statute can be waived. Nevertheless, although each of the nine statutes has different
characteristics, the statutes all unfairly discriminate against honest persons who are
prevented from testifying.
A. Florida
Florida’s Dead Man’s statute can be found at Florida Statute chapter 90.602 and
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
No person interested in an action or proceeding against the personal
representative, heir at law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of a
deceased persons, or against the assignee . . . shall be examined as a
witness regarding any oral communication between the interested persona
and the person who is deceased or mentally incompetent at the time of the
examination.58
Florida’s Dead Man’s statute has specific exceptions included in its provisions for
when the statute does not apply, including (1) when the personal representative or
similar party is questioned about the oral communication and (2) when evidence
concerning the oral communication is offered by the personal representative or
similar party.59 According to the Probate and Trust Litigation Committee of the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law section of the Florida Bar Association, “the [Dead
Man’s] Statute continues to be one of the most difficult statutes to understand in
considering the exclusion or admissibility of testimony in a probate litigation
procedure.”60 The Committee is currently reviewing the Dead Man’s statute.61
Florida’s Dead Man’s statute is limited in scope, in that it only applies to actions
against “the personal representative, heir at law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or
survivor of a deceased persons, or against the assignee.”62 The person bringing the
action against this party must also have “a personal and immediate interest in the
issue being litigated.”63 The statute also only refers to oral communications and not
to “transactions,” a term used in most state Dead Man’s statutes.64 When Florida
limited its Dead Man’s statute in 1976, the statute was worded so that it “only
excludes testimony that refers to conversations between an interested party and a
deceased person. It does not exclude written testimony by an interested party
regarding written transactions or communications with a deceased person.”65 The

58

FLA. STAT. ch. 90.602 (2003).

59

Id.

60

Florida Bar Association, Probate and Trust Litigation
http://www.flagbarpptl.org/pt_litigation.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).

Committee,

at

61

Id.

62

FLA. STAT. ch. 90.602(1) (2003).

63

Walton v. Estate of Walton, 601 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Estate of Parson, 416 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
64

See Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).

65

Id.
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statute also does not exclude “[t]estimony regarding nonverbal conduct, such as
execution, delivery, and negotiation of a contract . . . .”66 Florida’s revision of its
Dead Man’s statute reduced the scope of potential litigation surrounding the statute,
but the revisions did not prevent the fraudulent and unfair treatment of honest
persons in court.
Practitioners can waive the statute’s application, and “many practitioners
inadvertently waive the [Dead Man’s] statute and the potential impact it could have
on their cases.”67 Overall, the Dead Man’s statute is waived when the protected party
introduces or relies on evidence that relates to the oral communication.68 One recent
case, In re Estate of Stetzko v. Coleman,69 dealt a harsh blow to the future availability
of the Dead Man’s statute in will contest cases. In Stetzko, the court held that a party
will waive the applicability of the statute if any written or documentary evidence
concerning the subject matter of the litigation is entered into evidence.70 Thus, “in
most, if not all, will contests, the statute will be waived because the person
attempting to uphold the will must first introduce it was properly executed.”71
B. Indiana
The Indiana Dead Man’s statute, located at Indiana Code Annotated § 34-45-2-4,
provides, in part, that “a person (1) who is a necessary party to the issue or record;
and (2) whose interest is adverse to the estate; is not a competent witness as to
matters against the estate.”72 “[T]he purpose of this statute is to protect decedents’
estates from spurious claims,”73 and fairness is no justification for a trial judge to
ignore the specific instructions of the statute.74 The statute is most commonly
applied in Indiana “when an executor or administrator of an estate is one party, [and]
the adverse parties are not competent to testify about transactions that took place
during the lifetime of the decedent.”75
For the statute to be applied, the moving party must establish multiple criteria,
including (1) that the personal representative is a party to the lawsuit, (2) that there
could be a judgment against the estate, (3) that the testifying witness is a party to the
lawsuit and has an interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, (4) that the action involves
some “matter” that occurred when the decedent was alive, and (5) that the statute has
not been waived. If the preceding criteria are met, the witness cannot testify “as to
66

Bauerle v. Brush, 820 So. 2d 310, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also Carpenter v.
ex. rel. Wemyss, 638 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255.
67

Simon & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 145.

68

See FLA. STAT. ch. 90.602(2)(b) (2003); see also Moneyhun v. Vital Indus., 611 So. 2d
1316, 1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
69

714 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

70

Id. at 1090.

71

Id. (quoting CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 602.1, at 358-59 (1997)).

72

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4 (Michie 2003).

73

In re Estate of Lambert v. Southard, 785 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

74

Id.

75

Id.; see also J.M. Corp. v. Roberson, 749 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
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matters against the estate,”76 but the witness could still testify as to “matters that
occurred while the decedent was alive.”77 A “matter” under the statute “includes
transactions or actions as well as conversations.”78 Witnesses prevented from
testifying in the trial court are also prevented from authenticating documents and
other tangible evidence that is somehow related to the “matter” with the decedent.79
First, the statute will only apply “to all cases in which a judgment may result for
or against the estate, notwithstanding the parties’ positions as plaintiff or
defendant.”80 Thus, following the language established by the Indiana Court of
Appeals, the judgment must “either directly or indirectly affect the estate of the
decedent.”81 This initial provision also requires that the personal representative be a
party to the lawsuit.82 Thus, defendants in wrongful death actions are not prohibited
from testifying, because the wrongful death action is not brought against the estate.83
In addition, if for some reason the statute of limitations or otherwise the passage of
time has prevented the decedent’s estate from being held liable for damages,
testimony by interested witnesses or parties is allowed because the Dead Man’s
statute does “not intend . . . to prevent testimony that could not, in any way, affect
the estate assets.”84
Second, the moving party must show the witness is a party to the issue or record
and that the party has some interest in the outcome to the lawsuit.85 The Indiana
Court of Appeals has held that a witness has an interest in the proceeding when “the
witness will gain or lose by the direct legal operation of that judgment.”86
Nevertheless, a witness’s testimony will be excluded only if the witness is a party to
the issue. “A party to the issue means the parties between whom there is a
controversy submitted to the court for trial, the parties who are litigating the
particular issue against whom or for whom the court will render judgment.”87 The
moving party must establish both of these criteria.
Third, the moving party must establish that the event occurred in the decedent’s
lifetime and that the statute has not been waived. While proving that an event
76

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4 (Michie 2003).

77

Johnson v. Estate of Rayburn, 587 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

78

In re Estate of Sutherland, 204 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind. 1965).

79

State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Ft. Wayne Nat’l Bank, 474 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985); see also Merritt v. Straw, 33 N.E. 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 1893).
80

In re Estate of Loubert, , 785 N.E.2d at 1132.

81

Jenkins v. Nachand, 290 N.E.2d 763, 768-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).

82

Johnson v. Estate of Rayburn, 587 N.E.2d 182, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

83

Goldman v. Cha, 704 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Lake E. & W. R.
Co. v. Charman, 67 N.E. 923 (Ind. 1903).
84

Jenkins, 290 N.E.2d at 769.

85

See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4(b) (Michie 2003).

86

In re Estate of Lambert v. Southard, 785 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see
also Satterthwaite v. Estate of Satterthwaite, 420 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
87

Satterthwaite, 420 N.E.2d at 290.
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occurred within the decedent’s lifetime is self-explanatory, Indiana practitioners can
waive the Dead Man’s statute’s application if the practitioner “opens the door” by
questioning the witness or if the practitioner enters the deposition testimony of the
decedent taken while the decedent was alive.88
C. Louisiana
Louisiana’s Dead Man’s statute is slightly different than other jurisdictions in
that it allows parol evidence, so long as certain conditions are met. More
specifically, the statute, found at Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated § 13:3721,
reads:
Parol evidence shall not be received to prove any debt or liability of a
deceased person against his succession representative, heirs, or legatees
when no suit to enforce it has been brought against the deceased prior to
his death, unless within one year of the death of the deceased: (1) A suit to
enforce the debt or liability is brought against the succession
representative, heirs, or legatees of the deceased; (2) The debt or liability
is acknowledged by the succession representative as provided in Article
3242 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or by his placing it on a tableau of
distribution, or petitioning for authority to pay it; (3) The claimant has
opposed a petition for authority to pay debts, or a tableau of distribution,
filed by the succession representative, on the ground that it did not include
the debt or liability in question; or (4) The claimant has submitted to the
succession representative a formal proof of his claim against the
succession, as provided in Article 3245 of the Code of Civil Procedure.89
Although this statute will, at times, allow an interested party to testify against the
estate of the decedent, the statute still prevents “stale and unfounded claims from
being filed against the succession which could have been refuted by the decedent had
he been alive.”90 Louisiana courts are to strictly construe the statute.91
To help prevent fraudulent claims against an estate, Louisiana first requires that
all claims against an estate be filed within one year of the death of the decedent.92
Second, Louisiana will allow certain testimony about a debt against an estate,
including the testimony of the claimant; however, “the debt or liability of the
deceased must be proved by the testimony of at least one creditable witness other
than the claimant, and other corroborating circumstances.”93 The “one credible
interest,” however, cannot have an interest in the claim.94 “[A] person who has a

88
Kalwitz v. Estate of Kalwitz, 759 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4(e) (Michie 2003).
89

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3721 (West 2003).

90

In re Succession of Moore, 696 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

91

In re Succession of Larmore, 518 So. 2d 1085, 1087 (La. Ct. App. 1987).

92

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3721 (West 2003).

93

Harper v. Wells Estate, 575 So. 2d 894, 897 (La. Ct. App. 1991).

94

Id. at 898 (citing Savoie v. Estate of Rogers, 410 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. 1981)).
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direct pecuniary or proprietary interest in the plaintiff's claim against the deceased
person may not serve as the one creditable witness” against the estate.95
D. Maryland
Maryland’s Dead Man’s statute was “[f]irst enacted by Chapter 109, Acts of
1864, [and] the Maryland Dead Man statute remains merely a remnant of the
common law disqualification of all interested witnesses.”96 The statute, found in
Maryland Code Annotated, Courts and Judicial Proceeding § 9-116, reads:
A party to a proceeding by or against a personal representative, heir,
devisee, distributee, or legatee as such, in which a judgment or decree
may be rendered for or against them, or by or against an incompetent
person, may not testify concerning any transaction with or statement made
by the dead or incompetent person, personally or through an agent since
dead, unless called to testify by the opposite party, or unless the testimony
of the dead or incompetent person has been given already in evidence in
the same proceeding concerning the same transaction or statement.97
Similar to most states, Maryland enacted their Dead Man’s statute “to equalize
the parties' positions by imposing silence on the survivors as to transactions with or
statements by the decedent and thereby require those who have asserted a claim
against the decedent's estate to produce testimony from disinterested persons.”98
Maryland courts, however, “consistently ha[ve] favored the admission of
testimony”99 and the qualification of a witness is largely at the discretion of the trial
court.100
Because Maryland courts have favored admitting evidence, the Dead Man’s
statute applies only when the suit is brought “by or against a personal representative,
heir, devisee, distributee, or legatee.”101 Moreover, only certain parties are excluded
from testifying at the trial court. A “party,” as defined by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Reddy v. Mody is “one who has an interest in the property sought or a
person having a direct pecuniary and proprietary interest in the outcome of the
case.”102 The court in Mody goes on to note that “[e]xcept in very unusual cases, the
persons excluded from testifying are not those with an interest of any sort, but rather
traditional real parties in interest and their representatives.”103 Maryland’s statute is

95

Savoie v. Estate of Rogers, 410 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. 1981).

96

Herbert J. Belgrad, Note, The Effect of the Dead Man’s Statute on the Testimony of
Party-Witnesses: Ridgley v. Beatty, 21 MD. L. REV. 60, 64 (1961).
97

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-116 (2002).

98

Walton v. Davy, 586 A.2d 760, 765 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).

99

Id.

100

Davis v. Corbin, 346 A.2d 488, 495 (Md. Ct. App. 1975).

101

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-116 (2002).

102

Reddy v. Mody, 388 A.2d 555, 560 (Md. Ct. App. 1978) (citations omitted).

103

Id.
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thus extremely limited in scope, allowing attorneys,104 third parties and the like to
testify in proceedings.105 In Maryland, the Dead Man’s statute does not apply to
actions brought by the beneficiary of an insurance contract106 or by “an officer,
director, or shareholder of a corporate party.”107 The statute also does not apply in
wrongful death actions, as “money recovered by [one party] is received by them in
their own right and not through the estate of the deceased because of their status as
heir, devisee, distributee or legatee.”108
The Maryland Dead Man’s statute applies only to “testimony of a party to a
cause which would tend to increase or diminish the estate of the decedent.”109
Furthermore, this testimony must involve a “transaction” with the decedent. The
Maryland Supreme Court in Ridgley v. Beatty110 relied on a New Jersey Supreme
Court opinion to develop a test for what is and what is not a transaction. Thus, in
Beatty, the Court announced that “for determining what is a ‘transaction with’ a
decedent in the statutory sense . . . [one should ask] ‘[w]hether, in case the witness
testify falsely, the deceased, if living, could contradict it of his own knowledge.’”111
Maryland’s courts are required to strictly construe the statute “in order to disclose
as much of the evidence as possible.”112 Courts, nevertheless, must allow testimony
if a party trigger’s the statutes first exception, the admission of “testimony of the
dead or incompetent person.”113 As noted by the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Hamilton v. Caplan,114 testimony is “evidence given by a competent witness, under
oath or affirmation, as distinguished from evidence derived from writings, and other
sources.”115 Because the admission of the decedent’s testimony would further the
purpose of the statute, by placing both parties on equal ground, courts must admit a
witness’s testimony if it relates to the decedent.116 The statute’s second exception is
triggered when a party “opens the door” by cross-examining or otherwise
questioning the witness about a “transaction” or statement with the decedent.117
104

See, e.g., Walton v. Davy, 586 A.2d 760 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that an attorney,
who was not a beneficiary and did not represent a beneficiary, was allowed to testify).
105
Ebert v. Ritchey, 458 A.2d 891, 896 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the Dead Man’s
statute applies to “testimony by parties, not by third persons”).
106

Stout v. Home Life Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 28, 31 (D. Md. 1986).

107

Guernsey v. Loyal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 172 A.2d 506, 507 (Md. Ct. App. 1961).

108

Reddy, 388 A.2d at 559.

109

Id.

110

Ridgely v. Beaty, 159 A.2d 651 (Md. Ct. App. 1960).

111

Id. at 655 (quoting Hollister v. Fiedler, 111 A.2d 57, 62 (N.J. 1955)).

112

Reddy, 388 A.2d at 560; see also Stacy v. Burke, 269 A.2d 837, 845 (Md. Ct. App.

1970).
113

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-116 (2002).

114

Hamilton v. Caplan, 518 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. App. 1987).

115

Id. at 1095 (quoting Reddy, 388 A.2d at 560).

116

Id.; see also Reddy, 388 A.2d at 560.

117

Kaouris v. Kaouris, 603 A.2d 1350, 1353-54 (Md. Ct. App. 1992).
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E. South Carolina
South Carolina’s Dead Man’s statute can be found at South Carolina Code
Annotated § 19-11-20 and reads, in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 19-11-10, no party to an action or
proceeding, no person who has a legal or equitable interest which may be
affected by the event of the action or proceeding, no person who, previous
to such examination, has had such an interest, however the same may have
been transferred or come to the party to the action or proceeding, and no
assignor of anything in controversy in the action shall be examined in
regard to any transaction or communication between such witness and a
person at the time of such examination deceased, insane or lunatic as a
witness against a party then prosecuting or defending the action as
executor, administrator, heir-at-law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee
or survivor of such deceased person or as assignee or committee of such
insane person or lunatic, when such examination or any judgment or
determination in such action or proceeding can in any manner affect the
interest of such witness or the interest previously owned or represented by
him.118
While the statute is longer than most other state’s Dead Man’s statutes, the South
Carolina Supreme Court noted in Hanahan v. Simpson119 that “the rule prohibits any
interested person from testifying concerning conversations or transactions with the
decedent if the testimony could affect his or her interest.”120 The Hanahan court
went on to note that “[t]he rule is founded on the principle that it is against public
policy to allow a witness thus interested to testify as to matters when such testimony,
if untrue, cannot be contradicted.”121 Courts in South Carolina narrowly construe the
statute “to limit its applicability to cases which clearly fall within its intended
note.”122
South Carolina courts have determined that the Dead Man’s statute applies only
in a number of limited circumstances. Three main criteria need to be proven for the
statute to apply: (1) there must exist some transaction or communication between the
witness and the deceased; (2) the lawsuit must be against or brought by the executor,
administrator, heir-at-law, next of kin or the like of the decedent, and (3) the
outcome of the lawsuit must affect a present interest of the witness.123
First, the statute is applicable only to those persons who are “interested” in the
outcome of the lawsuit.124 “As such, a person is only disqualified if he or she has a

118

S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law Co-op. 2003).

119

Hanahan v. Simpson, 485 S.E.2d 903 (S.C. 1997).

120

Id. at 909.

121

Id.; see also Harris v. Berry, 98 S.E.2d 251 (S.C. 1957); Trimmier v. Thomson, 19 S.E.
291 (S.C. 1894).
122

Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 909 (citations omitted).

123

Kelly v. Peeples, 362 S.E.2d 636, 638 (S.C. 1987).

124

S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law Co-op. 2003).
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certain or vested legal or equitable interest which may be affected by the direct, legal
operation of the judgment.”125 Possible or future interests are thus not enough for
South Carolina courts; instead, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, in In re Estate
of Mason v. Mason,126 noted:
The four classes [of persons to whom the Dead Man’s statute applies] are
(1) a party to the action, (2) a person having an interest which may be
affected by the trial's outcome, (3) a person who previously had an interest
which may be affected by the trial, and (4) an assignor of the thing in
controversy.127
“Interest” means the witness will “either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.”128 Therefore, if a witness does not stand to gain or lose
from the judgment, such as an attorney representing the estate, he or she will be
considered competent to testify.129
Second, the statute applies only to “transactions” between the witness and the
decedent.130 The testimony about the transaction must involve the witness and the
decedent, it must be offered against the estate, and it must affect the witness’s
interest.131 “Transactions,” however, do not include “the acts, demeanor or conduct
of the decedent where the testimony is offered merely for its bearing on an issue of
mental competency.”132 In addition, because a transaction requires mutuality
between the witness and the decedent, accidents, such as boat and trailer accidents
and car accidents, are not considered “transactions” under the Dead Man’s statute.133
Witnesses, however, may testify to transactions between the decedent and a third
person,134 and witnesses may testify against his or her own interest.135 Witnesses and
parties may also introduce documentary evidence.136
A party can waive the statute’s applicability when the representative of the estate
“opens the door” by offering testimony and evidence that would have been excluded
125

Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910; see also Long v. Conroy, 143 S.E.2d 459, 462 (S.C.

1965).
126

In re Estate of Mason, 346 S.E.2d 28 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).

127

Id. at 31 n.2 (citing Long v. Conroy, 143 S.E.2d 459 (S.C. 1965)).

128

Conroy, 143 S.E.2d at 463.

129
Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910; see also Havird v. Schissell, 166 S.E.2d 801 (S.C. 1969)
(holding that an attorney was not disqualified even though he stood to collect an ordinary and
usual fee from the proceeding).
130

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003).

131

In re Estate of Mason v. Mason, 346 S.E.2d 28, 31-32 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).

132

Havird, 166 S.E.2d at 806.

133

See Starnes v. Miller, 266 S.E.2d 790, 791 (S.C. 1980).

134

See Moore v. Trimmier, 11 S.E. 548 (S.C. 1889); see also Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910.

135

See Devereux v. McCrady, 24 S.E. 77 (S.C. 1896); Shell v. Boyd, 11 S.E. 205 (S.C.
1890); see also Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910.
136

See Harris v. Berry, 98 S.E.2d 251 (S.C. 1957); see also Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910.
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under the statute.137 The statute is also waived when the representative of the estate
fails to object to testimony at the trial court.138
F. Tennessee
Tennessee enacted its Dead Man’s statute to prevent the surviving party from
having some sort of advantage when a decedent’s representative is disadvantaged for
not being able to recount the decedent’s version of the transaction or statement.139
Enacted in 1869, Tennessee’s Dead Man’s statute can be found at Tennessee Code
Annotated § 24-1-203 and reads:
In actions or proceedings by or against executors, administrators, or
guardians, in which judgments may be rendered for or against them,
neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any
transaction with or statement by the testator, intestate, or ward, unless
called to testify thereto by the opposite party. If a corporation is a party,
this disqualification shall extend to its officers of every grade and its
directors.140
In 2003 the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the Dead Man’s Statute “prohibits
an interested party in a proceeding involving the estate of a deceased person from
testifying as to transaction or statements by the deceased, unless the interested party
was called to testify by the opposite party.”141
For the statute to apply in Tennessee, “the proposed witness must be a party to
the suit in such a way that judgment may be rendered for or against him . . . [and] the
subject matter of his testimony must be of some transaction with or statement by the
testator or intestate.”142 Tennessee’s statute is thus more liberal than some states, as
it does not apply to statements made by non-parties,143 even if the non-party has an
interest in the litigation.144 The statute also does not apply to statements by parties
that neither increase nor decrease the size of the decedent’s estate.145 Thus, if the
outcome of the case would require the estate to pay the successful party regardless of
the litigation’s outcome, the testimony will not be excluded.146 In addition, while
137
Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 909-10; see also Norris v. Clinkscales, 25 S.E. 797 (S.C.
1896); Thomas v. Taylor, 386 S.E.2d 630 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
138

See Pinkerton v. Jones, 423 S.E.2d 151, 153 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Harris v. Campbell,
358 S.E.2d 719, 720 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
139

See Baker v. Baker, 142 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

140

TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (2003).

141

Estate of Myers v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank Corp., No. M2002-00888-COA-R3-CV,
2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612, at *13-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003).
142

Estate of Pritchard v. McDonald, 735 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

143

Gibson v. Parkey, 217 S.W. 647, 648 (Tenn. 1919).

144

See Montague v. Thomason, 18 S.W. 264, 265 (Tenn. 1892).

145

Cantrell v. Estate of Cantrell, 19 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Baker,
142 S.W.2d at 744).
146

Beadles v. Alexander, 68 Tenn. 604 (1877).
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Tennessee extended the Dead Man’s statute in 1947 to include officers and directors
of corporations, Tennessee courts have refused to extend the statute to other forms of
agency.147
While an interested party to the lawsuit is excluded from testifying, “the Dead
Man’s Statute applies only in cases ‘by or against executors, administrators, or
guardians.’”148 Thus, “where an action is brought against a surviving party in his or
her individual capacity only, the statute does not apply.”149 Witnesses are not
prevented from testifying as to transactions between him or herself and a third
party.150
The decedent’s personal representative can testify in limited circumstances when
multiple parties are involved. “Where there are multiple parties to a lawsuit, one of
whom is [the personal representative], that witness can still testify as to the
transaction with the decedent as to the other parties to the suit, even though [the
statute] renders a witness incompetent to testify against the estate.”151 Because the
estate would not be diminished if the personal representative’s testimony is favorable
to the estate, such testimony would also be allowed.
While there exists little case law in Tennessee as to what constitutes a
transaction, it is clear that a transaction can be either oral or in writing.152 The
Tennessee Supreme Court noted that transactions “refer to things done in the
intestate’s presence, to which he might testify of his personal knowledge, if alive, not
to transactions out of his hearing and presence, though affecting liability of his
estate.”153 The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Watts v. Rayman, has further defined
a transaction to include “matters of personal communication between the claimant
and the deceased.”154 The Court of Appeals has also held that transactions can occur
via tort actions.155 Overall, following the Tennessee Court of Appeal’s decision in
Kurn v. Weaver, the Dead Man’s statute will come into play when “judgment may be
rendered for the representative party and against the proposed witness, or vice
versa.”156
Similar to other states, Tennessee’s Dead Man’s statute can be waived if the
interested party is called to testify and the opposing attorney (1) neglects to object to

147

See Pritchard, 735 S.W.2d at 449.

148

In re Estate of Burress, No. E2002-00320-COA-R3-CV 2003 WL 238820, at *5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2003).
149

Id.; see also Hooper v. Neubert, 381 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963); McKamey v.
Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).
150

Waggoner v. Dorris, 68 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

151

Haynes v. Cumberland Builders, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

152

Montague, 18 S.W. at 265.

153

Newman v. Tipton, 234 S.W.2d 994, 996 (Tenn. 1950) (quoting Waggoner, 68 S.W.2d
at 145.
154

Watts v. Rayman, 462 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).

155

Christofiel v. Johnson, 290 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

156

Kurn v. Weaver, 161 S.W.2d 1005, 1021 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).
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his or her testimony and (2) cross-examines the witness.157 On the other hand,
Tennessee law protects the parties from cross-examining a witness who testifies over
objection158 and during discovery proceedings, as one party can depose the other
party without having to worry about waiving the Dead Man’s statute.159 This does
not include a situation where a party is deposed before trial and then dies after giving
his or her deposition. In these cases, because both parties had the benefit of their
own testimony, the purpose of the Dead Man’s statute is not invoked, and the
testimony is allowed.160
In Tennessee, the Dead Man’s statute “cannot be extended by the courts to cases
not within its terms upon the idea they fall within the evil which was intended to be
guarded against.”161 In other words, the Tennessee statute must be strictly
construed.162 The competency of the witness is nevertheless to be determined by the
trial judge.163
G. Washington
Washington’s Dead Man’s statute is found at Revised Code of Washington
section 5.60.030 and states:
No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving evidence by
reason of his or her interest in the event of the action, as a party thereto or
otherwise, but such interest may be shown to affect his or her credibility:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That in an action or proceeding where the
adverse party sues or defends as executor, administrator or legal
representative of any deceased person, or as deriving right or title by,
through or from any deceased person, or as the guardian or limited
guardian of the estate or person of any incompetent or disabled person, or
of any minor under the age of fourteen years, then a party in interest or to
the record, shall not be admitted to testify in his or her own behalf as to
any transaction had by him or her with, or any statement made to him or
her, or in his or her presence, by any such deceased, incompetent or
disabled person, or by any such minor under the age of fourteen years:
PROVIDED FURTHER, That this exclusion shall not apply to parties of
record who sue or defend in a representative or fiduciary capacity, and
have no other or further interest in the action.164
157

Rose v. Stalcup, 731 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

158

Leffew v. Mayes, 685 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that “where
transactions with the dedecent are first developed on direct examination over objection of the
representative of the decedent, the objection is not waived by subsequent cross-examination”);
see also Nabors v. Gearhiser, 525 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. 1975).
159

See Ingram v. Phillips, 684 S.W.2d 954, 958-59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

160

Bernard v. Reaves, 178 S.W.2d 224, 227-28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

161

Haynes, 546 S.W.2d at 230.

162

Id. at 231; see also Newman, 234 S.W.2d at 996; Christofiel, 290 S.W.2d at 218.

163

Roy v. Sanford, 204 S.W. 1159, 1161 (Tenn. 1918).

164

WASH. REV. CODE, § 5.60.030 (2003).
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The statute, which has contained roughly the same language since 1881,165 is
designed to “prevent interested parties from giving self-serving testimony about
conversations or transactions with the decedent.”166 The statute protects estate from
fraud and invasion.167
First, a “party in interest” in Washington covers “one who stands to gain or lose
in the action in question.”168 Thus, a “party in action” need not be limited to an
actual party in the lawsuit; however, third parties are not excluded under
Washington’s statute.169 Non-natural parties, including corporations and agents to
corporations, 170 and certain employees171 are also not prevented from testifying.
Second, a transaction, under the statute, “is broadly defined as the doing or
performing of some business between parties, or the management of any affair”172
and includes events “much broader than a contract” between the decedent and the
witness.173 The subject matter of testimony will fit the definition of a “transaction”
when “the deceased, if living, could contradict the witness of his own knowledge.”174
“[T]he testimony must indicate that the decedent was both present and directly
involved in the matter at hand.”175 In addition, if the proffered testimony “tends to
show either what did or did not take place between the parties, it must be excluded so
long as it concerns the transaction or justifies an inference as to what it really
was.”176 A party in action, nevertheless, can testify about “his or her own feelings or
impressions” of the decedent in the lawsuit.177

165

Patrick A. Trudell, Comment, The Deadman’s Statute in Washington, 15 GONZ. L. REV.
501, 504 (1979).
166
Wildman v. Taylor, 731 P.2d 541, 543 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); see also Erikson v. Kerr,
883 P.2d 313, 316 (Wash. 1994).
167

Estate of Lennon v. Lennon, 29 P.3d 1258, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).

168

Id. at 1263; see also Bentzen v. Demmons, 842 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).

169

Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see also Rabb v. Estate of McDermott, 803 P.2d 819, 823
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Boober, 784 P.2d 186, 189 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990).
170

Thor v. McDearmid, 817 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).

171

See, e.g., McLean v. Archer, 201 P.2d 184 (Wash. 1948) (holding that a secretary and
bookkeeper of a corporation was allowed to testify); May v. Triple C Convalescent Ctrs., 578
P.2d 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a nurse at a nursing home was allowed to
testify).
172

Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263 (quoting Bentzen, 842 P.2d at 1019) (internal quotation
omitted).
173

In re Shaughnessy’s Estate, 648 P.2d 427, 429 (Wash. 1982).

174

Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263.

175

Id. at 1265.

176

Id. at 1263; see also Martin v. Shaen, 173 P.2d 968, 971 (Wash. 1946).

177

Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263; see also Jacobs v. Brock, 437 P.2d 920, 922 (Wash. 1968).
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This statute, however, applies only to oral evidence and actions of the
decedent.178 “[R]ecords kept in the ordinary course of business,”179 “documents
written or executed by the deceased,”180 and “other documents relating to the
transaction at issue”181 are not excluded via an application of the statute. Testimony
about these written documents, however, could be limited by application of the Dead
Man’s statute.182
Washington’s Dead Man’s statute can be waived under three separate
circumstances: “the failure to object to the evidence, by cross-examination that is not
within the scope of direct examination, or by presenting testimony favorable to the
estate.”183 First, as noted by the Washington Court of Appeals in In re Estate of
Lennon v. Lennon,184 “[f]ailure to timely object to the testimony of an interested
party waives the bar of the deadman’s statute.”185 This objection must occur in
contested hearings.186 Second, Lennon also notes that “[o]nce the protected party has
opened the door, the interested party is entitled to rebuttal.”187 This door, however, is
not opened by taking depositions or serving interrogatories during the discovery
portion of the trial, so long as some portion of the deposition transcript or other
evidence related to the transaction is not introduced in the trial court as evidence.188
If the representative of the estate enters such evidence, the statute’s application will
be waived.189
H. West Virginia
The West Virginia Dead Man’s statute, first adopted in 1868, states, in relevant
part, that:

178

Bentzen, 842 P.2d at 1019.

179

Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see, e.g., Sanborn v. Dentler, 166 P. 62, 64 (Wash. 1917);
Goldsworthy v. Oliver, 160 P. 4, 5 (Wash. 1916); Ah How v. Furth, 43 P. 639, 640 (Wash.
1896); Vogt v. Hovander, 616 P.2d 660, 662-63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
180
Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see, e.g, Hampton v. Gilleland, 379 P.2d 194, 197-98 (Wash.
1963); Denis v. Metzenbaum, 213 P. 453, 454 (Wash. 1923); Slavin v. Ackman, 204 P. 816,
817 (Wash. 1922); Kauffman v. Baillie, 89 P. 548, 550-51 (Wash. 1907).
181
Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see also Bentzen, 842 P.2d at 1015 (waiver by submission of
affidavit of decedent's son regarding transaction in support of summary judgment); Thor, 817
P.2d at 1384 (waiver by introduction of letter written to decedent).
182

Wildman, 731 P.2d at 545-46.

183

Stranberg v. Lasz, 63 P.3d 809, 813 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); see also Botka v. Estate of
Hoerr, 21 P.3d 723, 726 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
184

Lennon v. Lennon, 29 P.3d 1258 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).

185

Id. at 1264.

186

Id.

187

Id. at 1263; see also Johnston v. Medina Imp. Club, Inc., 116 P.2d 272 (Wash. 1941).

188

Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263 (2001); see also McGugart v. Brumback, 463 P.2d 140, 144
(Wash. 1969).
189

Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263-64.
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No party to any action, suit or proceeding, nor any person interested in the
event thereof, nor any person from, through or under whom any such
party or interested person derives any interest or title by assignment or
otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any personal
transaction or communication between such witness and a person at the
time of such examination, deceased, insane or lunatic, against the
executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee
or survivor of such person, or the assignee or committee of such insane
person or lunatic.190
Premised on the belief that “there is a very strong temptation to lie or to conceal
material facts to the detriment of the decedent’s representative,”191 the purpose of the
statute, as defined by the West Virginia Supreme Court, “is to prevent the injustice
that would result from a surviving party to a transaction testifying favorably to
himself or herself and adversely to the interest of a decedent, when the decedent’s
representatives would be hampered in attempting to refute the testimony by reason of
the decedent’s death.”192 Instead of disqualifying the testimony itself, West Virginia
disqualifies the witness alone, giving third parties the right to testify to matters that
would be prevented by the statute.193
In the 1996 case Meadows v. Meadows, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia established new guidelines for applying the West Virginia Dead Man’s
statute and further limited the previously broad scope of the statute.194 Although
West Virginia Rule of Evidence 601 notes that “[e]very person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided for by statute or these rules,”195 Rule 601 defers
to the state legislature to determine the competency of witnesses.196 More
importantly, “the primary purpose for providing for the exception in Rule 601 was to
protect the integrity of the West Virginia Dead Man’s Statute.”197 Rule 601 did not
abolish the Dead Man’s statute.198
When applying the West Virginia statute to a proceeding, “the language of the
Dead Man’s statute should be strictly construed and limited to its narrowest
application.”199 After all, as the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia notes, a
restrictive application of the statute promotes “an enhanced confidence in the jury
190

W. VA. CODE § 57-3-1 (2003).

191

Cross v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 387 S.E.2d 556, 561 n.6 (W. Va.

1989).
192

Meadows v. Meadows, 468 S.E.2d 309, 313 (W. Va. 1996).

193

Id.

194

Id. at 312.

195

W. VA. R. EVID. 601.

196

Meadows, 468 S.E.2d at 313.

197

Id.

198

Cross, 387 S.E.2d at 560 (1989).

199

Meadows, 468 S.E.2d at 314 (citing Harper v. Johnson, 345 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex.
1961)).
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system and the role of the adversarial cross-examination.”200 When applying the
statute, the court should ensure that (1) the witness is a party to or is interested in the
lawsuit and (2) that the testimony involves some communication or some personal
transaction with one of the statutorily-listed persons.201
For the statute to apply, a witness must either be a party to the lawsuit or be
“interested” in the outcome of the proceeding. Parties to lawsuits, even if they have
no interest in the lawsuit’s outcome, are not allowed to testify.202 Interested persons,
as defined in Coleman v. Wallace203 to include those persons who can be affected by
the result of the suit, are also prohibited from testifying.204 To exclude testimony, the
interest must be definite and present, not somehow contingent or remote.205
While a “communication” is somewhat self-explanatory, the Meadows court
narrowed the definition of “personal transaction” to “requiring something in the
nature of a negotiation or a course of conduct or a mutuality of responsibility
resulting from the voluntary conduct of opposing parties . . . [such as] when one
enters upon a course of conduct after a knowing exchange of reciprocal acts or
conversations.”206 Because it is not a transaction, the statute “does not bar a party or
interested witness from testifying as to the deceased’s appearance and demeanor and
the witness may give an opinion as to the deceased’s competency . . . .”207 A witness
is also not prevented from testifying against his or her own interest in the lawsuit.208
As with other states, the disqualification of a witness via the Dead Man’s statute
is waived in certain circumstances. First, a party waives the right to apply the Dead
Man’s statute if the party calls the witness on its own behalf.209 Second, if the
personal representative opens the door by testifying against the claim of some
interested party, the previously excluded witnesses are allowed to testify as to the
specific matter mentioned by the personal representative.210 The witness’s
responsive testimony, however, should be limited to explaining, rebutting or
otherwise denying the testimony by the personal representative.211 Third, application
200
Id. at 314 (quoting FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK
VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 1-4(A) (3d ed. 1994)).

ON

EVIDENCE

FOR

WEST

201

See W. VA. CODE § 57-3-1 (2003).

202

Hudkins v. Crim, 61 S.E. 166, 169 (W. Va. 1908) (stating that a party is to be excluded
from testifying “regardless of any interest”).
203

Coleman v. Wallace, 104 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1958).

204

Id. at 351.

205

Lilly v. Ellison, 148 S.E. 380 (W. Va. 1929).

206

Meadows, 468 S.E.2d at 315.

207

Id. at 316.

208
Cale v. Napier, 412 S.E.2d 242, 247 (W. Va. 1991) (quoting Holland v. Joyce, 185
S.E.2d 505, 511 (W. Va. 1971)).
209

See Holland v. Joyce, 185 S.E.2d 505, 511 (W. Va. 1971).

210

In re Estate of Thacker, 164 S.E.2d 301, 306 (W. Va. 1968)

211

Kimmel v. Shroyer, 28 W. Va. 505, 510 (1886), overruled on other grounds by
Meadows v. Meadows, 468 S.E.2d 309 (W. Va. 1996).
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of the Dead Man’s statute is waived if no objection to the competency of the witness
is made at the trial court; a party cannot wait until appeal to claim testimony should
have been excluded via the Dead Man’s statute.212 A party is not precluded from
cross-examining witnesses in West Virginia if there has been a proper objection to
the direct examination.213 A party is also not precluded from taking the deposition of
a witness during the discovery phases of the trial, if the witness is otherwise
prevented from testifying at the trial because of the application of the Dead Man’s
statute.214
I. Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s Dead Man statute is contained in Wisconsin Statute § 885.16 and is
extended in Wisconsin Statute § 885.17 to transactions one party has had with an
agent of an adverse party, when the agent is deceased.215 Section 885.16 states:
No party or person in the party's or person's own behalf or interest, and no
person from, through or under whom a party derives the party's interest or
title, shall be examined as a witness in respect to any transaction or
communication by the party or person personally with a deceased or
insane person in any civil action or proceeding, in which the opposite
party derives his or her title or sustains his or her liability to the cause of
action from, through or under such deceased or insane person, or in any
action or proceeding in which such insane person is a party prosecuting or
defending by guardian, unless such opposite party shall first, in his or her
own behalf, introduce testimony of himself or herself or some other
person concerning such transaction or communication, and then only in
respect to such transaction or communication of which testimony is so
given or in respect to matters to which such testimony relates. And no
stockholder, officer or trustee of a corporation in its behalf or interest, and
no stockholder, officer or trustee of a corporation from, through or under
whom a party derives the party's interest or title, shall be so examined,
except as aforesaid.216
For over three decades, Wisconsin courts have urged the statute should be repealed
and have “unabashedly take[n] the position that [the Dead Man’s statute’s] effect
should be limited wherever possible.”217 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
advocated a strict construction of the statute, suggesting “that it is preferable for a

212

First Nat’l Bank v. Bell, 215 S.E.2d 642, 645 (W. Va. 1975).

213

Poteet v. Imboden, 88 S.E. 1024, 1028 (W. Va. 1916).

214

Martin v. Smith, 438 S.E.2d 318, 323 (W. Va. 1993).

215

See WIS. STAT. § 885.17 (2003) (stating, in relevant part, that “[n]o party . . . shall be
examined as a witness in respect to any transaction or communication by the party or person
personally with an agent or an adverse party of the agent of the person from, through or under
whom such adverse party derives his or her interest or title, when such agent is dead or
insane . . .”).
216

WIS. STAT. § 885.16 (2003).

217

In re Estate of Molay v. Molay, 175 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Wis. 1970).
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jury to weigh the credibility of a witness’s testimony rather than suppress his
testimony altogether.”218
While the Supreme Court has noted the statute is an “archaic view of the law,”219
a party moving to exclude a witness’s testimony “must show that: (1) there was a
transaction or communication between the decedent or witness; (2) the witness has
an interest in the matter at hand; and (3) the liability or cause of action of the party
advocating incompetence arose from, through or under the deceased.”220 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court places strong emphasis on objecting not to the evidence
itself but to the competency of the witness.221 Because the Court is in favor of the
statute’s repeal, the Court will not consider, on appeal, objections at the trial court
made to the testimony itself.222
First, the objecting party must establish that an interested survivor will “testify
about a course of conduct between himself and the deceased which may constitute a
transaction”223 or that the witness will “testify to conduct between himself and the
deceased which may provide the basis for an inference that a transaction
occurred.”224 A transaction means some “personal transaction with the deceased . . .
in which each [party] is an active participant.”225 The statute, on the other hand,
“does not prohibit the survivor from describing an event or physical situation, or the
movements or actions of a deceased person . . . in no way connected with . . . the
conduct of the party testifying.”226 The statute also does not prohibit testimony by
third persons, so long as the third-person witness did not participate in the
transaction and “the participants were not affected by the witness presence.”227 Quite
possibly a loophole, third persons can also testify as to transactions between an
interested witness and the decedent.228
218

Havlicek/Fleisher Enters. v. Bridgeman, 788 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Wis. 1992).

219

Molay, 175 N.W.2d at 259.

220

Schimpf v. Gerald, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (E.D. Wis. 1999).

221

Estate of Robinson, 123 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Wis. 1963).

222

Molay, 175 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting FRANK L. MALLARE, WISCONSIN CIVIL TRIAL
EVIDENCE, § 1.663, at 24) (1967); see also Giese v. Reist, 281 N.W.2d 86, 91-92 (Wis. 1979);
In re Estate of Chrisopherson, 650 N.W.2d 52, 60 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the
“strictly-imposed requirement about the precise wording of the objection is the result of the
disfavor with which the courts view this statute, and one way the courts have limited its
effect”).
223

Johnson v. Mielke, 181 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Wis. 1970).

224

Id.

225

Seligman v. Hammond, 236 N.W. 115, 117 (Wis. 1931).

226

Id.

227

Schimpf v. Gerald, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987-88 (E.D. Wis. 1999).

228

See, e.g., Bridgeman, 788 F. Supp. at 397; Stuart v. Crowley, 217 N.W. 719, 721 (Wis.
1928); Nelson v. Christensen, 172 N.W. 741, 742 (Wis. 1919); McHatton v. McDonnell’s
Estate, 165 N.W. 468, 469 (Wis. 1917); In re Laugen’s Will, 99 N.W. 437, 438 (Wis. 1904);
Brader v. Brader, 85 N.W. 681, 683 (Wis. 1901); Wollman v. Ruehle, 80 N.W. 919, 920 (Wis.
1899).
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Second, because “when a witness has no interest in the outcome of the action, he
has no reason to conceal or lie about facts surrounding the transaction,”229 the
objecting party must establish the witness is somehow interested in the verdict.230 As
noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, it must be shown that the witness is a
party231 that has some right or interest in the verdict itself, or could somehow receive
an interest after the verdict is rendered.232 “[T]he true test of the disqualifying
interest of the witness is whether he [or she] will gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment, or that the record will be legal evidence for or
against him [or her] in some other action.”233 The interest cannot be uncertain or
contingent; instead, the interest must be “present, certain, and vested.”234 Thus, the
testimony of a spouse or a child of an interested party is allowed, since those parties’
interests are held as remote and contingent.235
Wisconsin courts are strict in applying the Dead Man’s statute; therefore, a party
must be careful that he or she does not waive the statute’s applicability at the trial
court. First, a party will waive the statute’s application if the party cross-examines
the witness and does not object to the competency of the witness, but the party can
cross-examine the witness after a proper objection is overruled.236 The party should
be careful to not extend its cross-examination into areas not previously covered by
the initial objection, as exceeding the scope of the objection is a grounds for being
denied protection of the statute.237 Second, the party will waive the statute’s
application if the trial court objection is not precisely worded.238
IV. CRITICISM OF DEAD MAN’S STATUTES
Although they remain valid law in nearly a dozen states, Dead Man’s statutes
have been criticized by nearly all famous legal scholars over the past 150 years.
Dean Wigmore, former Dean of the Northwestern University School of Law and a
master on American evidentiary law, stated:
As a matter of policy, this survival of the now discarded interest
qualification is deplorable in every respect; for it is based on a fallacious

229
Bridgeman, 788 F. Supp. at 397 (citing Estate of Kemmerer, 114 N.W.2d 803 (Wis.
1962)).
230

See WIS. STAT. § 885.16 (2003).

231

In re Estate of Christen, 239 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Wis. 1976).

232

Johnson v. Mielke, 181 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Wis. 1970).

233

Id. at 510; see also In re Williams’ Will, 41 N.W.2d 191 (Wis. 1950); In re Estate of
Novak, 193 N.W. 1000 (Wis. 1923).
234

State v. Fonk’s Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc., 395 N.W.2d 786, 792 (Wis. Ct. App.

1986).
235

See, e.g., Estate of Christen, 239 N.W.2d at 530; Estate of Nale, 213 N.W.2d 552, 555
(Wis. 1974).
236

Molay, 175 N.W.2d at 260.

237

Id.

238

In re Estate of Chrisopherson, 650 N.W.2d 52, 60 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
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and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more false decision than it
prevents, and it encumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren
quibbles over the interpretation of mere words.239
Edmund Morgan, another famous scholar and former Reporter for the MODEL CODE
noted that Dead Man’s statutes:

OF EVIDENCE,

are based upon the delusion that perjury can be prevented by making
interested persons incompetent or by excluding certain classes of
testimony. They persist in spite of experience which demonstrates that
they defeat the honest litigant and rarely, if ever, prevent the dishonest
from introducing the desired evidence: if the dishonest party is prevented
from committing perjury, he is not prevented from some suborning it. If
the statutes protect the estates of the dead from false claims, they damage
the estate of the living to a much greater extent. And frequently their
application prevents proof of a valid claim by the representative of [the]
decedent’s estate.240
Even Professor McCormick, whose very treatise on evidence law is considered a
staple in the world of hornbooks, notes that:
Most commentators agree that the expedient of refusing to listen to the
survivor is . . . a “blind and brainless” technique. In seeking to avoid
injustice to one side, the statute-makers ignored the equal possibility of
creating injustice to the other. The temptation to the survivor to fabricate
a claim or defense is obvious enough, so obvious indeed that any jury will
realize that his story must be cautiously heard.241
Even though each of the nine states surveyed in this article have different forms of a
Dead Man’s statute, each state statute suffers from the same four criticisms.
First, as outlined by Dean Wigmore, these statutes assume that some people are
more dishonest than honest.242 America’s judicial system is based on presuming one
is innocent until proven guilty, but by their very nature, Dead Man’s statutes prevent
an entire class of persons from testifying because of an assumption that all witnesses
are bound to lie when the lips of one are sealed due to death. For this very reason
alone, Dead Man’s statutes should be repealed so as to give each party and witness
the opportunity to present evidence to the trier-of-fact. Cross-examination provides
a decedent’s counsel the ability to highlight bias and potential fraudulent claims, and
in today’s world of television, movies, and multimedia, juries are smarter than ever
about judicial proceedings and are unlikely to act incompetent when a potential
fraudulent claim is presented in court. With the options of deposing and
interviewing both the “interested” parties and third parties, “[a] searching crossexamination will usually, in case of fraud, reveal discrepancies inherent in the

239

WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578, at 822-23.

240

EDMUND M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 187-88 (1956).

OF

PROOF UNDER

THE

ANGLO-AMERICAN

241

MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 65, at 251.

242

WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578, at 822.
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‘tangled web’ of deception.”243 Our judicial system should afford a trier-of-fact the
option of weighing that testimony and determining whether a party indeed has a
valid claim against an estate.
Second, Dead Man’s statutes present an injustice to the very witnesses who are,
in fact, honest and have a valid claim against a decedent or intestate who, by one
reason or another, was unable to make testamentary arrangements for a person. A
hypothetical helps to illustrate this injustice. A farmer has two sons, Dan and Andy.
As the farmer grows old, Dan and Andy both move their separate ways in life. Andy
remains home to assist with the needs of the farm and to care for his ailing father,
and Dan moves to Los Angeles to pursue a career in acting. When their father has a
massive stroke, Andy takes over all the daily tasks on the farm and works a second
job on the side to pay for his father’s medicinal needs. Dan, on the other hand,
ignores pleas from his brother that his help is needed on the farm and that their father
is dying. The father, aware of Andy’s unconditional love and support and Dan’s
mere love of fame and fortune, tells his son Andy that “You are to take total
possession of my estate. Please call my lawyer and ask him to come here tomorrow
to change my will.” The father, however, dies that night in his sleep. If Andy were
to make a claim against the estate, he would be precluded from testifying that his
father intended to give him all assets and property from his estate. Even though
Andy has a valid and honest claim, no trier-of-fact will hear his claim if a Dead
Man’s statute is valid law. These laws create an injustice to Andy, as they will
presume Andy is lying and attempting to take advantage of the estate. In the end,
Dan will take half of the estate.
Third, Dead Man’s statutes are incorrectly worded to accomplish their goal.
While it is true that the statutes “intended to prevent an undue advantage on the part
of the living over the dead, who cannot confront the survivor, or give his version of
the affair, or expose the omission, mistakes or perhaps falsehoods of such
survivor,”244 these very statutes contain critical exceptions that give dishonest
persons the ability to use fraud and falsehoods to take advantage of an estate. Most
importantly, many Dead Man’s statutes create an exception that allows third parties
to testify.245 To quote Professor McCormick, “[o]ne who would not balk at perjury
[on his or her own] will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would not
be disqualified, to swear to the false story.”246 Therefore, even though Dead Man’s
statutes intend to prevent harm against an estate, these same statutes invite fraud,
since an honest party will be unable to dispute the fraudulent third-party claims in
court.

243

MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 65, at 251.

244

Owens v. Owens’s Adm’r, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878).

245

Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia, for example,
allow third parties to testify to transactions and communications surrounding the decedent and
the “interested” party. See, e.g., Ebert v. Ritchey, 458 A.2d 891, 896 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1983) (noting the Dead Man’s statute applies to “testimony by parties, not by third parties”);
Moore v. Trimmier, 11 S.E. 548, 552 (S.C. 1890); Waggoner v. Dorris, 68 S.W.2d 142, 145
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1933); Erikson v. Kerr, 883 P.2d 313, 316 (Wash. 1994); Meadows v.
Meadows, 468 S.E.2d 309, 313(W. Va. 1996).
246

MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 65, at 251.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss1/6

28

2005-06]

AN OUTDATED FORM OF EVIDENTIARY LAW

103

Fourth, scholars, lawyers, judges, and scholars alike are in utter confusion with
the “labyrinth of decisions, which have often brought confusion rather than
clarity.”247 Although taken over twenty years ago, one study in the state of
Washington found that 68% of attorneys and 80% of judges felt the Washington
Dead Man’s statute was confusing and difficult to administer.248 Nevertheless, since
the Survey was taken in 1979, Washington courts have continued to broaden, narrow
and otherwise change the scope of the Dead Man’s statute, which still remains valid
law.249 Repealing the Dead Man’s statutes would overturn tens of thousands of
pages of case law in the nine jurisdictions surveyed in this article and create a system
where triers-of-fact would be given the ability to determine the competency and
credibility of a witness. Instead of placing faith in 100 year-old decisions from this
“archaic view of the law,”250 juries could judge for themselves whether a witness was
entitled to property or assets.
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
In order to achieve justice in this nation, Dead Man’s statues should be abolished
for other forms of protection against a decedent. This article presents three separate
alternatives for states to consider in order to become more in line with those other
jurisdictions that have abolished or otherwise repealed the Dead Man’s statute.251
First, this article proposes that states follow the lead of Ohio, and presumably
Alabama, and pass a new Rule of Evidence 601 providing that “Every witness is
competent except as provided by these rules.”252 Instead of stopping at a new Rule
601, states should also expressly repeal the Dead Man’s statute in their jurisdiction.
By repealing the statute and enacting a new Rule 601 to become the governing rule
of competency of witnesses, states will simplify court procedure and follow the
initial guidelines of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence.253 Such legislation
also clears up both trial court and appellate court dockets and saves money from the
statute’s application. Although our nation adopted the Dead Man’s statute from
ancient English law, England never enacted a Dead Man’s statute and “there has
been no indication that dead men’s estates have been plundered in that country by
false claimants.”254 As such, besides being free of the “false claimants,” England’s
trial dockets are also free of the Dead Man’s statute clutter that fills dockets in the
United States.
Justice cannot be truly served, however, by the mere passing of a new Rule 601
and the repeal of the Dead Man’s statute. If a state is to allow an interested party to
testify as to a decedent’s statements and transactions, the state should also create a
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new hearsay exception that affords a decedent’s estate the right to submit evidence to
the trier-of-fact that responds to, denies, or contradicts the interested party’s
testimony. Two states, California and New Hampshire, have enacted such a hearsay
exception, and these two states present states the chance to mirror their legislation on
already-existing legislation. New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) provides:
In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of
deceased persons, including proceedings for the probate of wills, any
statement of the deceased, whether written or oral, shall not be excluded
as hearsay provided the Trial Judge shall first find as a fact that the
statement was made by the decedent, and that it was made in good faith
and on the decedent’s personal knowledge.255
California’s hearsay exception, found at Evidence Code § 1261, is similar and reads:
(a) Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule
when offered in an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of the
declarant if the statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the
declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him
and while his recollection was clear. (b) Evidence of a statement is
inadmissible under this section if the statement was made under
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.256
Both of these statutes give the decedent’s estate the option of testifying as to the
decedent’s actual intentions. Furthermore, both statutes safeguard the rights of the
decedent and the interested party by giving the trial judge the opportunity to exclude
testimony if it appears remote or false, or if it is given in bad faith.257
To further the initial purpose of the Dead Man’s statutes, states should repeal
their current Dead Man’s statute, enact a more concise Rule 601, and enact a hearsay
exception that gives decedent’s estates the right to introduce statements of the
decedent in response to the interested party’s testimony. As noted by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, Dead Man’s statutes intended to place two parties, the decedent
and the interested party, on equal ground.258 New legislation puts these parties on
equal ground by allowing both parties to testify about the decedent’s intentions,
transactions or statements.
Second, if states decide they would like to enact more protection for the
decedent’s estate than the first proposal for change affords, states should enact
legislation providing jury instructions in will contests and other similar matters
noting that “clear and convincing evidence” must be provided to find a decedent
intended to distribute property to or incurred some debt against an interested party.
A “clear and convincing evidence” standard would place interested parties at an
automatic disadvantage, as their testimony and evidence would be presumed false
without other evidence to support the evidence. While it is true that the interested
party could ask third parties and other witnesses to lie on their behalf as supportive
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evidence, third parties can already testify in proceedings; therefore, this potential
downfall should not be considered.
Third, if states decide that Dead Man legislation is too vitally important for the
protection of the decedent’s estate, states should, at the minimum, follow the lead of
Arizona and give trial judges the right to apply the statute at their own discretion.259
Affording power to the trial judge gives states the ability to protect the rights of an
honest, yet interested party, in limited circumstances as the trial judge sees fit.260
Such legislation also affords the decedent’s estate the right to appeal a trial judge’s
inclusion of testimony on an abuse of discretion standard.261 At the very least, this
option gives some light of hope to interested parties, although either of the previous
two options are a more ideal solution to this common law nightmare.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although this article has provided a brief historical lesson on Dead Man’s
statutes and has overviewed the scope and application of nine separate Dead Man’s
statutes, hundreds of additional pages could be spent further outlining the specific
application of each particular statute within its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, by
providing the reader with a sense of the complicated, confusing and unfair nature of
this form of common law legislation, the overall purpose of this article has been
accomplished.
Thirty-two states have expressly repealed their Dead Man’s statute.262 Of those
jurisdictions that retain this statute, Dead Man’s statues vary in scope and
application. These statutes are confusing and problematic, and as such, for each day
that these statutes remain valid legislation, our nation will continue to deny justice to
hundreds of persons. Therefore, when the state legislatures in the nine jurisdictions
discussed supra revisit their respective legislation in upcoming years, a change
should be made that allows all persons the chance to present their evidence and give
their own testimony in court. No matter if a state chooses one of the three proposals
for change outlined in this article or another option better suited for their jurisdiction
and citizens, states should adopt the current majority view and move toward a
evidentiary system that is more fair to the majority of persons.
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